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INTRODUCTION

What makes a deductive-nomological explanation "explain," is... that it tells us why E [an individual event]
had to be (occur), why E was necessary once the basis is
there and the laws are accepted.
-Georg Henrik von Wright'
What is truth? a mobile army of metaphors, metonyms,
anthropomorphisms,in short, a sum of human relations
which were poetically and rhetorically heightened,
transferred, and adorned,and after long use seem solid,
canonical, and binding to a nation.
2
-Friedrich Nietzsche
The law of rhetoric ...
speak the truth.

is that one must lie in order to
-Jean-Paul

Sartre3

For a long time we have been taught to interpret the law's
meaning and authority in the rhetoric of rhetoric's suppression.
Objectivity,4 neutrality,5 and acontextual comprehensiveness 6
* This essay is dedicated to Jerome Bruner, tireless trailblazer and teacher
extraordinaire.
** Professor of Law, New York Law School; J.S.D. 1989, L.L.M. 1985, Columbia; J.D.
1981, Boston College; B.A. 1975, Brandeis.
1. GEORG HENRIK VON WRIGHT, EXPLANATION AND UNDERSTANDING 13 (1971).

2. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, On Truth and Lying, in FRIEDRICH NIETTCHE ON RHETORIC
AND LANGUAGE 250 (Sander L. Gilman et al. eds. & trans., 1989) (n.d.).
3. JEAN PAUL SARTRE, SAINT-GENET: ACTOR & MARTYR 518 n.* (Bernard Frechtman
trans., 1963) (1952).
4. See generally H. Richard Uviller, The Advocate, The Truth, and JudicialHackles:
A Reaction to Judge Frankel's Idea, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 1067 (1975) ("[I]t seems to
me that properly directed and purged of obvious abuses, the juxtaposition of two contrary
perspectives, the impact of challenge and counter-proof, often discloses to a neutral
intelligence the most likely structure of Truth."); ALEXANDER WELSH, STRONG REPRESENTATIONS: NARRATIVE AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN ENGLAND (1992).
For the past two hundred years, irrespective of their differences, AngloAmerican and Continental courts of law have put primary emphasis on true
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have long served as academic standards by which to measure
scholarly achievement and judicial excellence. In legal academia,
impersonal abstractions rather than particular voices and dramas
have ruled the day. We have been taught (and more often than
not continue to teach others) to suppress the proper name, to play
down who figures how in the stories that lawyers and judges tell.
There is nothing surprising in this. After all, it has long been
a part of the Western philosophical tradition to prefer the abstract
and the universal over the particular and the contextual. Recall
Plato, who would have banished the poets and dramatic storytellers from his ideal state for fear of their undermining truth and
law.7 (Plato's own political tale apparently would have escaped
philosophical censure.8 ) Or consider Descartes, who derided the
eloquence of rhetoric and narrative in favor of reason's supposedly

representations of the facts. This state of affairs differs markedly from the
frank emphasis upon superior rhetoric among ancient authorities; the customs
of ordeal, combat, or compurgation known to early medieval Europeans; the
finally self-defeating methods of arriving at truth by torture and confession
introduced in the twelfth century; or the original uses of the English jury trial.
WELSH, supra, at 10.
5. See generally BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 309-10
(1980) ("[C]itizens of a liberal state have more than the right to complain in court when
others frustrate their desires. They have a right to relief when their fellows prove
incapable of justifying their power through Neutral dialogue."); id. at 10-12 (on the
desirability of neutrality); see also Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of
ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
6. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 13 (1971) ("Justice as fairness
begins... with one of the most general of all choices which persons might make together,
namely, with the choice of the first principles of a conception of justice which is to regulate
all subsequent criticism and reform of institutions."); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY 116-17 (1977) (describing Hercules as the ideal judge who "must construct a
scheme of abstract and concrete principles that provides a coherent justification for all
common law precedents and, so far as these are to be justified on principle, constitutional
and statutory provisions as well").
7. "MW~e can admit no poetry into our city save only hymns to the gods and the praises
of good men. For if you grant admission to the honeyed Muse in lyric or epic, pleasure and
pain will be lords of your city instead of law...." PLATO, The Republic, Book X, line 607a,
in PLATO, THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES (Edith Hamilton et al. eds., 1961) (n.d.) [hereinafter
PLATO, The Republic]; see also PLATO, GORGIAS (W.C. Helmbold trans., The Liberal Arts
Press, Inc. 1952) (n.d.) (equating rhetoric with beauty-culture and cookery, both of which
pander harmfully to our depraved tastes rather than what is true or real).
8. This is Plato's "opportune falsehood" and "one noble lie" based on the caste of an
individual's genetic metal. See PLATO, The Republic, supra note 7, at Book III, lines 414bc. "God in fashioning those of you who are fitted to hold rule mingled gold in their
generation, for which they are most precious-but in the helpers silver, and iron and brass
in the farmers and other craftsmen." Id. at lines 415a-b.
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unmediated clarity? (Yet Descartes also knew full well when "to
put forward his ideas plainly and unemotionally and when to
appeal to the irrational sides of human nature."1 ° )
And what of that other bright star in the Western philosophical firmament, Immanuel Kant? Did not Kant champion the
modernist faith in dispassionate rationality? Was it not his belief
that human reason could discern the intervention ofjustice in our
world, as if it were some mighty transcendent force?11 Did he
not insist upon the value of "disinterested" as opposed to "interested" judgments? 12 More recently, one can hear the echoes of
Kantian modernity in the words of John Rawls when Rawls
speaks about justice and the concept of right: "[Plrinciples should
be general. That is, it must be possible to formulate them
without the use of what would be intuitively recognized as proper
names, or rigged definite descriptions." 3 Justice as fairness,
under the Rawlsian veil of ignorance, has no need of proper
names or particular contexts. It has no need to hear personal
stories or to look upon the historied face of the other.
On the other hand there has always been an other hand-the
less dominant, less rule-bound, left-handed view. 4 Today, in the

9. RENE DESCARTES, Discourse on Method, in THE PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF RENE
DESCARTES (Elizabeth S. Haldane et al. trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1931) (n.d.) "Those
who have the strongest power of reasoning, and who most skillfully arrange their thoughts

in order to render them clear and intelligible, have the best power of persuasion even if
they can but speak the language of Lower Brittany and have never learned Rhetoric." Id.
at 85.
10. PETER FRANCE, RHETORIC AND TRUTH IN FRANCE: DESCARTES TO 'DIDEROT 67

(1972); see generally JEAN D. MOSS, NOVELTIES IN THE HEAVENS: RHETORIC AND SCIENCE
IN THE COPERNICAN CONTROVERSY (1993).
11. See RICHARD KUHNS, TRAGEDY: CONTRADICTION AND REPRESSION 98 (1991).
12. See IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT 199 (J.H. Bernard trans., Hafner
Press 1951) (n.d.) ("The beautiful pleases immediately ... apart from any interest. .. ");
cf. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE BIRTH OF TRAGEDY AND THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS 238
(Francis Golffing trans., Doubleday & Co. 1956) (1887) ("Kant, like all philosophers, instead
of viewing the esthetic issue from the side of the artist, envisaged art and beauty solely
from the 'spectator's' point of view, and so, without himself realizing it, smuggled the
'spectator' into the concept of beauty."). In Nietzsche's view, "All seeing is essentially
perspective, and so is all knowing. The more emotions we allow to speak in a given

matter, the more different eyes we can put on in order to view a given spectacle, the more
complete will be our conception of it, the greater our 'objectivity.'" NIETZSCHE, supra, at
255.
13. RAWLS, supra note 6, at 131.
14. See JEROME S. BRUNER, ON KNOWING: ESSAYS FOR THE LEFT HAND (expanded ed.
1979).
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natural sciences, 5 the social sciences, 1" the humanities, 7 and
the law, s the traditional repudiation of rhetoric and dramatic
narrative is being questioned. Increasingly, scholars are realizing
the inescapability of storytelling and the diverse ways in which
narratives construct what we regard as truth and reality. 9 But
of course this too is not new. Even before Plato there was
Isocrates, who advised young men "to spend some time on [the
exact sciences, like astronomy and geometry], but not to allow
their minds to be dried up by these barren subtleties, nor to be
stranded on the [theoretical] speculations of the ancient sophists
..... 20 And even after Descartes, there was Vico, who warned:

15. See generally PAUL FEYERABEND, SCIENCE IN A FREE SOCIETY (1978); THOMAS S.
KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970).
16. See generally JEROME BRUNER, ACTS OF MEANING (1990) (psychology); REID HASTIE
ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY (1983) (same); SIMON SCHAMA, DEAD CERTAINTIES (1991) (history);
HAYDEN WHITE, METAHISTORY: THE HISTORICAL IMAGINATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY
EUROPE (1973) (same); RICHARD A. SHWEDER, THINKING THROUGH CULTURES: EXPEDITIONS
IN CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY (1991) (anthropology); SALLY E. MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE AND
GETTING EVEN: LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG WORKING-CLASS AMERICANS (1990) (same);
Kim L. Scheppele, Foreword:Telling Stories, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073 (1989) (sociology); Kim
L. Scheppele, Just the Facts Ma'am: Sexualized Violence, Evidentiary Habits, and the
Revision of Truth, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 123 (1992) (same).
17. See generally RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTMSM AND RELATIVISM:
SCIENCE, HERMENEUTICS, AND PRAXIS (1983) (philosophy); RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY
AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979) (same); JACQUES DERRIDA, MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY
(Alan Bass trans., University of Chicago Press 1982) (1972) (same); ON NARRATIVE (W. J.
T. Mitchell ed., 1981) (literary criticism); WAYNE BOOTH, MODERN DOGMA AND THE
RHETORIC OF ASSENT (1974) (same).
18. See generally W. LANCE BENNETT & MARTHA S. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING
REALITY IN THE COURTROOM: JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1981);
BERNARD S. JACKSON, LAW, FACT AND NARRATIVE COHERENCE (1988); Lawyering Theory
Symposium: Thinking Through the Legal Culture, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 9 (1992).
19. See, e.g., Jerome Bruner, A Psychologist and the Law, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 173
(1992).
Stories are so compelling and useful a way of representing deviations from
expectancy in the world that cultures typically include a good stock of them in
their tool kit of ready mades. This tool kit is... used incessantly. Studies of
white, working-class families in Baltimore show, for example, that children
who hang around adult conversations are exposed to real-life narratives at the
rate of about six per hour ....
Id. at 176 (footnote omitted).
20. ISOcRATES, Antidosis, in ISOCRATES II 334-35 (T.E. Page et al. eds., & George
Norlin trans., Loeb Classical Library 1929) (n.d.).
For since it is not in the nature of man to attain science by the possession of
which we can know positively what we should do or what we should say, in
the next resort I hold that man to be wise who is able by his powers of
conjecture to arrive generally at the best course, and I hold that man to be a
philosopher who occupies himself with the studies from which he will most
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"There is a danger that instruction in advanced philosophical
criticism may lead to an abnormal growth of abstract intellectualism, and render young people unfit for the practice of eloquence." 2
And today, in the time of Rawls and Ackerman and Dworkin,
increasingly, in the legal academy, we hear and read left-handed
scholarly talk about the making and telling of stories. The new
discourse comes from scholars who study particular legal
contexts2 2 and who seek to give life to particular (often unheard)
voices and dramas in the legal culture.2 3 In these works we are
being invited, as Professor Peggy Davis has aptly put it, to
consider "how people get together, talk, and settle upon
articulations-and therefore upon interpretations-of facts and of
governing rules... [and] the characteristics of mind and culture
that structure the weaving of stories .... 24
Today the dominance of the rhetoric of rhetoric's suppression
is easing. Amid the smoothing, depersonalized narratives of
sweeping principle and decontextualized abstraction, other
rhetorics can now be heard.2" In the legal culture today one can
discern the rhetoric of multi-vocality, empathy, and emotion

quickly gain that kind of insight.
Id. at 334-35.
21. GIAMBATTISTA VICO, ON THE STUDY METHODS OF OUR TIME 13 (Donald Verene &
Elio Gianturco trans., Cornell Univ. Press 1990) (1709). It was Vico who also said: "It often
happens that people unmoved by forceful and compelling reasons can be jolted from their
apathy, and made to change their minds by means of some trifling line of argument." Id.
at 15.
22. See, e.g., Susan H. Williams, Legal Education, Feminist Epistemology, and the
Socratic Method, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1571, 1574 (1993) ("Knowledge can be understood as a
social practice deeply embedded in a particular culture ....
One's position in a social
framework will have profound effects on what one knows and the path by which one comes
to know it, and no social position can claim access to some undistorted truth."); Peggy C.
Davis, Law and Lawyering: Legal Studies with an Interactive Focus, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 185 (1992).
23. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL
JUSTICE (1987); PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991); Robin
D. Barnes, Race Consciousness:The Thematic Content of RacialDistinctiveness in Critical
Race Scholarship, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1864, 1865 (1990); see also Sandra D. O'Connor,
Thurgood Marshall:The Influence of a Raconteur, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1217, 1217-20 (1992).
24. Peggy C. Davis, The ProverbialWoman, 48 REC. ASS'N B. CITY N.Y. 7, 7 (1993); see
WILLIAM TWINING, RETHINKING EVIDENCE 223 (1990) ("'A story is a narrative of particular
events arranged in a time sequence and forming a meaningful totality.'" (citing Paul
Ricoeur)).
25. See Donald P. Spence, Narrative Smoothing and Clinical Wisdom, in NARRATIVE
PSYCHOLOGY: THE STORIED NATURE OF HUMAN CONDUCT 211 (Theodore R. Sarbin ed.,
1986).
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playing out against a living backdrop of drama, myth, and
metaphor.26 These diverse rhetorical and narrative forms have
always been there, even if their authority has at times fallen into
desuetude. Perhaps in the years to come the reemergence of
storytelling in the field of legal scholarship will come to be seen
as part of a much larger cultural development; for convenience, let
us call it postmodernism. In light of this culture-wide shift away
from the positivist model for knowledge, cognition and perception,
legal scholars and teachers of law may more readily be inclined
to give serious thought to the realities that practicing lawyers and
judges face everyday. They too will see that from the scraps and
fragments of lived experience stories are being told-told to
communicate,2 7 to persuade,'
and at times simply to be
heard.2 9
As a result of such heightened sensitivity to the importance
and pervasiveness of storytelling in the law, storytelling itself has
come in for greater scholarly scrutiny. 0 This is not surprising
given the number of unanswered questions in this area. For
example, of what are legal stories made and how do they work?
How does a story trigger our narratival expectations, leading us
to the familiar site of a known genre? How does the story exploit
our world knowledge-the numerous and varied cultural scripts,

26. See generallyMari J. Matsuda, Voices of America:Accent AntidiscriminationLaw,
and a Jurisprudencefor the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329 (1991); Lynne N.
Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574 (1987); Richard I. Sherwin,
Dialectsand Dominance:AStudy of RhetoricalFields in the Law of Confessions, 136 U. PA.
L. REV. 729 (1988); Richard K. Sherwin, Lawyering Theory: An Overview-What We Talk
About When We Talk About Law, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 9, 17 nn.17-20 (1992); Anthony
G. Amsterdam & Randy Hertz, An Analysis of Closing Arguments to a Jury,37 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REv. 55, 64-65, 65 n.23, 95-96,96 nn.111-12, 112 n.145 (1992) (on myth and drama and

metaphor).
27. See generally JOHN M. CONLEY & WILLIAM M. O'BARR, RULES VERSUS RELATIONSHIPS: THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF LEGAL DISCOURSE (1990); Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie,

A Cognitive Theory of JurorDecision Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519
(1991) (analyzing how jurors make stories out of evidentiary fragments).
28. Willem J. Witteveen, Doctrinal Stories, 6 INT'L J. SEMIOTICS L. 179 (1993).
29. See generally Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking About Law
as Language, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2459 (1989); Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical
Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearingof Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1
(1990).
30. See generally Symposium, Lawyers as Storytellers & Storytellers as Lawyers: An
InterdisciplinarySymposium Exploring the Use of Storytelling in the Practice of Law, 18
VT. L. REV. 565 (1994); see also Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out
of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives,45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993); Jane B. Barron,
Resistance to Stories, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 255 (1994).
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schemata, and stereotypes, that we carry around in our heads? 3'
How does the story make use of shapeshifting mood devices, such
as Todorov's transformations, which alter the action of the verb
from a fait accompli (the historical fact of the matter) to an action
that is psychologically in process (what we might call the contingent or subjunctive mode)?3 2 Or consider: How do story structure
and character-typing interact with narrative composition and
genre selection in the creation of meaning?3
This article only takes a small step along one of the paths
that these inquiries project. Part I focuses on the narrative use
of schemata in a series of redescriptions of a possible case of
homicide. Part II examines the work of schemata and narrative
genre together with the effects of plot and mood in the stories
counsel told in briefs submitted to the United States Supreme
Court in the landmark case of Miranda v. Arizona. 4 My goal'
throughout is to try to convey a better sense of how particular
story elements can be used to shape and inform the meaning of a
particular legal reality. My hope is that this kind of close textual
analysis will stimulate increased self-reflectiveness about how
legal narratives trigger or induce a particular belief or expectation
concerning the explanatory value ("truthfulness") or verisimilitude
("lifelikeness") of the legal and factual realities that are being
portrayed.3 5
Before proceeding to the specific legal stories that this article
will invite you to consider, one more point may warrant explicit
noting. Much has been said over the years about the artificial
37
reason of the law. From Lord Coke's day36 down to our own,
jurists have referred to the law as a discipline unto itself. The
interpretive or constructivist approach offered here does not deny
that there may be practices which are unique to the legal culture.
31. See infra notes 59-63 and accompanying text (describing typical schemata and
scenarios as mental blueprints for how a particular kind of event plays out in life).
32. See, e.g., JEROME BRUNER, ACTUAL MINDs, POSSIBLE WORLDS 29(1986) [hereinafter
ACTUAL MINDS].
33. See, e.g., Jerome Bruner, The Narrative Construction of Reality, 18 CRITICAL
INQUIRY 1, 29 (1991) [hereinafter The Narrative Constructionof Reality].
34. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
35. For a fuller development of this theme, see Richard K Sherwin, Law Frames:
Historical Truth and Narrative Necessities in a Criminal Case, 47 STAN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 1994) [hereinafter Law Frames].
36. Prohibitions Del Roy, 77 Eng. Rep. 1342, 1343 (KB. 1608).
37. Charles Fried, The Artificial Reason of the Law or: What Lawyers Know, 60 TEX.
L. REv. 35 (1981).
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However, a significant aspect of the storytelling and, more
generally, of the interpretive turn in legal studies involves the
recognition of a complex interpenetration and cross-fertilization
from the mainstream to the legal culture, and vice-versa. Upon
closer scrutiny of the stories that lawyers and judges tell, it
becomes apparent that popular culture offers a rich source of
meaning schemata which daily inform and shape our expectations
about what constitutes a good story and how that story ought to
play out.
For example, in the legal culture, as in the mainstream
culture, there is evidence of a strong popular affection for the
detective story's ingenious, albeit straightforward, logic-driven
marshalling of clues culminating in closure and finality. 8 The
detective story typically takes us along a causally sequential path
ending with certainty, for in the end we know "who done it," who
is to blame. Such knowledge is often accompanied by a sense of
inevitability. As if to say, "If one were but to look at the matter
closely enough, the truth shall emerge. It is but awaiting
detection." 9 In this respect, the detective story may be said to
represent a popular version of the long-dominant "logico-scientific"

38. All those litigators and jurors who at one time were beguiled viewers of that
brilliant trial attorney, Perry Mason, know that in the final moment of artful crossexamination the confession will come and truth will dissolve any antecedent mystery. See
generally Steven D. Stark, PerryMason Meets Sonny Crockett:The History of Lawyers and
the Police as Television Heroes, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 229 (1987). Jeremiah Donovan also
mentioned this in his speech at the Symposium.
See also TZVETAN TODOROV, INTRODUCTION TO POETICs 41 (Richard Howard trans.,
University of Minn. Press 1981) (1968) ("Most works of fiction of the past are organized
according to an order that we may qualify as both temporal and logical; let us add at once
that the logical relation we habitually think of is implication, or as we ordinarily say,
causality."); Herbert Morris, The Decline of Guilt, 99 ETHics 62 (1988).
Among law's clearest lessons are that norms exist and that they are to be
taken seriously. These in turn provide reassurance that our social world is
orderly and not chaotic, that it is a structured space in which not everything
is permitted, where there are limits to conduct, a role for rational argumentation over who has crossed these limits, and, equally important psychologically,
that closure exists as a possibility once these limits have been breached.
Morris, supra, at 69; see also Law Frames, supra note 35.
39. It may be that one of the great functions of the law is to propagate a continued
belief in certitude and closure so that justice may be done. See Morris, supra note 38.
This is, perhaps, our own "noble lie," according to which the truth (of uncertainty) must
be suppressed for the sake of a greater truth (the possibility of justice). See RENE GIRARD,
VIOLENCE AND THE SACRED (Patrick Gregory trans., Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1977)
(1972) (on scapegoating).
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genre. 4' The world according to this genre is one in which logic
makes its demands and reality complies. Whether we desire it to
be so or not is quite beside the point, for surely impersonal
natural forces care not a wit for human wishes and feelings. We
must accept things as they are. We must accept reality. At least
that is the familiar posture in which one finds oneself when one
is in the grip of this kind of explanatory narrative genre. In the
logico-scientific story the audience is typically cast in the role of
objective observer, with a view of reality that is both dispassionate and fixed. Faced with what has been shown to be the case,
one accepts.
Prosecutors in criminal cases can be quite fond of the logicoscientific story form. 4 ' It comports nicely with their burden of
proof, namely to demonstrate guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
And it carries a solid psychological insight. Cast into a world of
objective truth, where deductive and inductive logic dictates
concrete results, jurors may more readily accept their fate: to
confirm what has already occurred, and to apply the rules that
govern legal outcomes in such situations. Passivity before truth
and law, letting the judgment that must come come, is a classic
(although by no means exclusive) formula for prosecutorial
success.
Of course, jurors may also be led to reject the passive role
that the prosecutor may cast for them. Rather than being ruled
by fixity and closure, jurors may instead enter a world of possibility and openness. At any rate, there is a good chance that this is
the kind of world that the defense's story will presuppose.42 This
kind of story lacks logico-scientific precision. Instead, it portrays
a world filled with contingencies, uncertainies-the stuff of
human drama. The world that it presupposes is psychologically
in process. In such a world, jurors are likely to feel compelled to
rely upon their own world knowledge in order to fill in the gaps
that the defense's story presents. And the inherited cultural
knowledge at the jurors' fingertips will be, at least so the defense
hopes, shaped and informed by the images, scripts, and familiar

40. See ACTUAL MINDS, supra note 32, at 12; see also The Narrative Construction of
Reality, supra note 33, at 19; CARLO GINZBURG, CLUES, MYTHS, AND THE HISTORICAL
METHOD 106-17 (John & Anne Tedeschi trans., Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1989) (1986)
(referring to the Galilean method of proof); VON WRIGHT, supra note 1.
41. See generally Amsterdam & Hertz, supra note 26.
42. See generally id.
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scenarios that defense counsel evokes during the course of the
trial. For unlike the prosecutor's passivity-inducing counternarrative, the defense wants the jurors to know that this is their
story too. They have the final say in the outcome of the drama.
On this view, truth and justice need not be externally demanded:
neither by objective reality nor by some impersonal ("logical")
force.43
From what has been said so far, one may begin to see how
different narrative genres compete for a legal audience's attention
and belief.44 But there is more to be discerned here than
competition among story genres, whether it is the genre of
historical truth or that of narrative seduction. One may also note
the influence of newly emerging story forms and storytelling
techniques. Consider, in this regard, the impact of the quick-cut
montage, the rapid juxtapositioning of sound and image in
contemporary film and television, particularly in television
advertising. 45 These same techniques can be seen again in the
thirty second sound bite on the news, or the ninety second
summation on L.A. Law, or in the glitzy channel-surfing

43. Compare, for example, Justice Blackmun's empathic and emotional narrative in
his dissent in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989),
with Justice Rehnquist's imperative, syllogistic interpretation of relevant case law in the
same case. According to Justice Rehnquist: "[Niothing in the language of the Due Process
Clause itself requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens
against invasion by private actors." Id. at 195. In contrast, Justice Blackmun states:
Poor Joshua! Victim of repeated attacks by an irresponsible, bullying,
cowardly, and intemperate father, and abandoned by respondents who placed
him in a dangerous predicament and who knew or learned what was going on,
and yet did essentially nothing except, as the Court revealingly observes...
"dutifully record[] these incidents in [their] files."
Id. at 213 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
44. See, e.g., Richard J. Gerrig & Deborah A. Prentice, The Representationof Fictional
Information, PSYCHOL. SCI., Sept. 1991, 336, 336-40; Daniel S. Bailis et al., The Influence
of Fictional Information on Beliefs About the Real World (May 1, 1993) (paper on file with
author); WAYNE C. BOOTH, THE COMPANY WE KEEP: AN ETHICS OF FICTION 16 (1988)
("W~e never read a story without making a decision, mistaken or justified, about the
implied author's answer to a simple question: Is this 'once-upon-a-time' or is it a claim
about events in real time?").
45. See, e.g., SERGEI M. EISENSTEIN, THE FILM SENSE (Jay Leyda ed. & trans., 1975)
(1942).
The task that confronts [the film director] is to transform [the director's inner]
image into a few basic partialrepresentationswhich, in their combination and
juxtaposition, shall evoke in the consciousness and feelings of the spectator,
reader, or auditor, that same initial general image which originally hovered
before the creative artist.
Id. at 30-31.
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emulations of MTV. Given the potency of these audio-visual
techniques, the more staid images and plodding plot forms of a
previous generation, along with the world-view that they presuppose (typically featuring the evidentiary smoking gun as part of
the airtight Sherlock Holmesian causal-analytic/mystery-expose
format) may be losing their grip upon popular belief.46 Today
the power of silent, rapid associations (as if unreeling scenes from
some subliminal mythological tale) may more readily do the trick
of truth-speak and persuasion.4 7
Consider the Rodney King affair. The general public's
interpretation of the beating of King was based primarily on the
mass media's extensive broadcast of the George Holliday videotape that captured the Los Angeles police officers' blows. This
contrasted sharply with the jury's interpretation which was based
not only on a slightly longer version of the Holliday videotape, but
one that the defense team had skillfully contextualized (against
the backdrop of an eight-mile, high-speed chase during which
King reached speeds approaching 100 miles per hour) and
reconstructed (using such techniques as freeze-frame sequencing
to emphasize the officers' responsiveness to King's resistant
behavior, and sound-track alterations to emphasize, for example,
the sound of a Taser stun-dart being fired rather than that of a
police baton blow). A recent New York Times article captures the
point well:
[P]hotographic images of all sorts remain essentially
ambiguous, and must be anchored in a convincing
narrative before they take on a specific meaning. And

46. To the TV generation, starting perhaps with the post-J.F.K assassination crowd,
the aesthetic jolt coming off the crime left unsolved (as frequently is the case in
contemporary television shows involving criminals, police, and lawyers) may surpass the
one coming offthe fact of resolution. In this way, we see that popular storytelling fashions
mimic, in form and in substance, a mood of uncertainty and disillusionment in the popular
culture. As novelist Don DeLillo recently stated in an interview about the assassination

of J.F.K:
We still haven't reached any consensus on the specifics of the crime: the
number of gunmen, the number of shots... the list goes on and on. Beyond
this confusion of data, people have developed a sense that history has been
secretly manipulated. . . . I think we've developed a much more deeply
unsettled feeling about our grip on reality.
Anthony DeCurtis, "An Outsider in This Society": An Interview with Don DeLillo, S.

ATLANTIC Q., Spring 1990, at 281, 286.
47. See, e.g., AcTuAL MINDS, supra note 32, at 28; Amsterdam & Hertz, supra note 26,
at 104-10, 105 n.129, 106-07 nn.134-35.
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most images can be made to fit into a number of widely
disparate narratives.
...

In news photography, captions play a crucial role

in defining not only what a photograph means, but even
what it depicts. Photojournalists are fond of recounting
incidents in which the same picture, with different
captions, has been used by different publications to
illustrate exactly opposite points of view.
In television news, the raw information provided by
the videotape of an event is heavily processed and filtered
by a variety of mechanisms before it gets on the air.4"
In short, whether the matter in question is technical or
popular, whether the medium in which it is being portrayed is
textual, audio-visual, or image only, there is no non-interpretative
way to frame its meaning. Because this is so, the world-view that
is prefigured in or presupposed by any storytelling technique,
cannot be idly ignored, not if its power is to be understood and
harnessed-or countered. 9 This means that in order to perform
effectively, many lawyers, particularly litigators, may be obliged
to keep abreast of (in order to tap into) the popular storytelling
forms and images that people commonly carry around in their
heads.50 Today the main source of these forms and images is the
electronic mass media. Legal scholars who ignore the truth of
this reality will increasingly be talking to themselves.
But if self-reflexive storytelling and the constructivist
(fiction/fact blending) spirit of postmodernism represent an
important part of the current cultural scene, that does not mean
that their impact is monolithic. For example, one might suggest

48. Charles Hagen, The Power of a Video Image Depends on the Caption, N. Y. TIMES,
May 10, 1992, § 2, at 32.
49. See, e.g., The Narrative Construction of Reality, supra note 33, at 16 ("The
normativeness of narrative, in a word, is not historically or culturally terminal. Its form
changes with the preoccupations of the age and the circumstances surrounding its
production.").
50. Cf. AL RIES & JACK TROUT, POSITIONING: THE BATTLE FOR YOUR MIND 5 (rev'd ed.
1986) ("To be successful [in advertising] today, you must touch base with reality. And the
only reality that counts is what's already in the prospect's mind."); see also Symposium,
Power Advocacy: Achieving Maximum Jury Impact During Trial, N.Y. ST. B. ASS'N, Oct.

15, 1993, at 3 (featuring a presentation entitled "Opening Statement: Lessons from L.A.
Law"). Litigators have conceded (albeit off the record) that they have been influenced by
the style and techniques of "L.A. lawyering."
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that the hard-corelesspostmodernism of some critical scholars5 1
and avant-garde film-makers5 2 is not the same as the soft-core
postmodernism that we witness in most contemporary film and
television-and in the most artful litigation.53 While the hardcoreless postmodernist may deny the very possibility of knowing
truth or reality, claiming that there is simply no "there" there to
know, the soft-core postmodernist offers more. Unlike their hardcoreless cousins, soft-core postmodernists are believers. Indeed,
it is by virtue of their (and our) belief in the substance of certain
images, feelings, myths, and dramatic forms that soft-core
postmodernists can hook us into particular ways of seeing,
thinking, and feeling about ourselves and others and events
around us. In this way, soft-core postmodernism is able to supply
more than the hard-coreless postmodernist's ironic laughter or
nihilistic despair in the face of cosmic emptiness or the endless
profusion of form. Soft-core postmodernists (like most of us) know

51. See, e.g., HAYDEN WHITE, THE CONTENT OF THE FORM: NARRATIVE DISCOURSE AND

HISTORICAL REPRESENTATION 75 (1987) ("One must face the fact that when it comes to
apprehending the historical record, there are no grounds to be found in the historical
record itself for preferring one way of construing its meaning over another."); RICHARD
RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY 20 (1989) ("[Tlhe world does not provide us
with any criterion of choice between alternative metaphors ....
we can only compare
languages or metaphors with one another, not with something beyond language called
'fact.'"); Martin Jay, Of Plots, Witnesses, and Judgments, in PROBING THE LIMITS OF
REPRESENTATION: NAZISM AND THE "FINAL SOLUTION" 97, 101 (Saul Friedlander ed., 1992)
[hereinafter PROBING THE LIMITS] ("If postmodernism means anything, it implies the
abandonment of precisely the dream of submitting to the exigencies of pure language or
pure vision.").
52. See, e.g., Anton Kaes, Holocaust and the End of History: Postmodern Historiography in Cinema, in PROBING THE LIMITS, supra note 51, at 206,208-12 ("I believe that HansJirgen Syberberg's controversial seven-hour film of 1978, self-consciously entitled
Hitler-A Film from Germany, represents one of the few attempts to come to terms with
the Nazi phenomenon in a way that challenges Hollywood story-telling .... .") Id. at 20809. "Syberberg is interested less in constructing history as a story with cause and effect
(thereby implying a logical development that can be 'understood') than in presenting
constellations and associations that surprise and shock the audience." Id. at 210.
Syberberg's translation of historical reality into a self-sufficient cosmos of
signs, intertexts, quotations, allusions, memories, and associations gives him
the freedom to encode German history in a variety of specular forms: as circus
spectacle and horror cabinet; as puppet theater, cabaret, and side show; as
tribunal; and as allegorical, baroque theatrum mundi. The central project of
the film is not the representation of Hitler himself but the representation of
the various ways in which Hitler has been represented.
Id. at 211-12.
53. See, e.g., Philip N. Meyer, "Desperate for Love": Cinematic Influences upon a
Defendant's ClosingArgument to a Jury, 18 VT. L. REV. 721; Jeremiah Donovan, Some Offthe-Cuff Remarks About Lawyers as Storytellers, 18 VT. L. REV. 751.
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that that kind of brittle laughter and despair have no place in the
world most of us inhabit-the everyday5 4world of judgment and
accountability, the law's proper domain.
What does it mean then, to speak of an end to the
suppression of rhetorical and narratological analysis in legal
education and scholarship? For one thing, I believe it has
something to do with the emergence of the human voice, the
proper name, the local drama. Witness in the legal culture today
the claim of "thick" analysis countering the traditional claim of
impersonal abstraction.5 5 As part of this development we find a
growing number of legal scholars inviting us to see and hear and
feel with the particular voice, the proper name struggling to
emerge from beneath the scholar's veil of ignorance. In addition
to the emergence of diverse story forms we are also witnessing
changes in the medium of storytelling itself. Consider the shift
from textual linearity to audio-visual non-linearity." By virtue
of this cultural development, the presentation of cumulative
causal sequences may be viewed as but one among other methods
of persuasion. For example, we also encounter the use of
powerful, isolated images, and the non-verbal associations that
they trigger in the viewer's mind. This too, is a highly effective

54. See Law Frames, supra note 35.
55. See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Thick Description:Towardan InterpretiveTheory ofCulture,
in THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 3, 9 (1973) (describing "thick" descriptions in
anthropology as "sorting out the structures of signification ... and determining their social
ground and import.").
56. See, e.g., Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, Paratexts,44 STAN. L. REV. 509,
510 (1992) ("We live in an era of 'paratexts,' in which words and images, as captured by
electronic recording, compete with print to represent legally significant events."); JAMES
B. TWITCHELL, CARNIVAL CULTURE: THE TRASHING OF TASTE IN AMERICA 51 (1992) ("What
characterizes the condition of culture since World War II is . . . that now we have more
signs than referrents, more images than meanings that can be attached to them. The
machinery of communication often communicates little except itself-signs just refer to
each other, creating a 'simulacra' of reality."); JEAN BAUDRILLARD, FATAL STRATEGIES (Jim
Fleming ed., Philip Beitchman & W.G.J. Niesluchowski trans., Semiotext(e) 1990) (1983).
What fascinates everyone is the debauchery of signs, that reality, everywhere
and always, is debauched by signs. This is the interesting game, and this is
what happens in the media, in fashion, in publicity and more generally, in the
spectacle of politics, technology, science ... because the perversion of reality,
the spectacular distortion of facts and representations, the triumph of
simulation is as fascinating as catastrophe-and it is one, in effect ....
BAUDRILLARD, supra, at 74.
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57
method of mobilizing desire and affecting belief.
As a result of these cultural and cognitive developments, or
perhaps as part of their occurrence, scholars in a variety of fields,
including law, are being led to ask wide-ranging questions about
how meaning occurs, or more aptly put, how meaning is
constructed.5" Surprisingly, we still know comparatively little
about what makes a good story work, or how it manages to enlist
our passion and belief. Thus we ask: What are the constituent
elements of a good story, and what function do they perform?
To begin to address these concerns in a particular legal
context, consider the following illustrative story. It involves a
possible case of homicide.

I. [RE-]CONSTRUCTING A HOMICIDE

Tony Kreskin was driving down a country road one day when
he spotted a figure staggering along the roadside. The person
looked hurt, so Kreskin stopped his car to investigate. When he
saw that the person was indeed injured, Kreskin helped him into
the car. The other's name, Kreskin soon learned, was Nicholas
Faccio. Faccio told Kreskin he had been robbed and beaten by
two unknown assailants.
57. See, e.g., DORIS-LOUISE HAINEAULT & JEAN-YvEs Roy, UNCONSCIOUS FOR SALE:
ADVERTISING, PSYCHOANALYSIS, AND THE PUBLIC 55 (Kimball Lockhart & Barbara Kerslake

trans., University of Minn. Press 1993) (1984).
It is abundantly clear that the acquisition of certain goods above all does
not depend on intellectual arguments; it is motivated instead by power or by
narcissistic or phallic libido. In some cases the advertising message offers a
range of intellectual arguments that can be used as camouflage or rationalizations.
Id. at 55-56.
In contrast to more conventional, straightforward, rational, causally-sequenced forms
of persuasion, the use of isolated images appeals to a distinctly non-linear, acausal
cognitive process (such as thesubconscious mobilization of desire). See Law Frames,supra
note 35.
Recent developments in chaos theory may also provide some useful insights here.
According to this theory, small differences can, after a number of repetitions, contribute
to disproportionate effects down the road. Applying chaos theory's non-linear approach to
law, one might say that just as a butterfly's wing flutter in China may produce a hurricane
in Florida, so, too, a defendant's inappropriate smile in the course of a criminal trial might
create the cognitive armature around which jurors weave a story of guilt. See generally
JAMES GLEICK, CHAOS: MAKING A NEW SCIENCE (1987); DRAGAN MILOVANOVIC,
POSTMODERN LAW AND DISORDER: PSYCHOANALYTIC SEMIOTICS, CHAOS AND JURIDIC
EXEGESES (1992).
58. See generally JAMES W. STIGLER ET AL., CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY: ESSAYS ON
COMPARATIVE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT (1990).
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After driving together for a while, Kreskin and Faccio struck
up a friendship of sorts. Faccio said that he was on his way to
play cards with an acquaintance of his, a wealthy man by the
name of James Smite. When Faccio invited Kreskin to come
along, Kreskin said okay.
While at Smite's house, following several hours of high stakes
poker, Smite and Faccio had an argument. Despite this, Faccio
and Kreskin spent the night at Smite's as planned. The next
morning Kreskin awakened to find Faccio sprawled on the front
lawn of the house. He'd been badly beaten and seemed close to
death. Learning of the situation, Smite arranged to have Faccio
taken to a local hospital. Kreskin was convinced that Smite had
ordered one of his employees, a man by the name of Jake Crosby,
to undertake the beating in order to teach Faccio a lesson.
Kreskin subsequently arranged to have Crosby as a passenger in
Kreskin's car. Kreskin then smashed up the car and Crosby was
killed.
The legal question that this incident immediately raised is
this: What are we to make of Jake Crosby's death? Was it simply
an accident? Or is Kreskin a criminal, the perpetrator of a
homicide?
Clearly, more facts are needed before a judgment can be
made. Fortunately, more details are at hand.
Installment One
The incident described here is based on a real case, although
the names have been changed. It was tried in state criminal
court and Kreskin was ultimately convicted of manslaughter.
Through witnesses and various exhibits at trial, the prosecutor
established that around the time the incident took place, the
defendant, Kreskin, was a middle-aged, unemployed drifter. After
inheriting some money following his father's death, he'd been
aimlessly driving around from one place to another.
Nicholas Faccio, the man Kreskin spotted on the roadside,
was a young professional card player. Apparently he had been
playing a high stakes game at the time he claimed to have been
robbed, beaten, and left on the roadside where Kreskin found him.
It was never made clear exactly who had attacked Faccio, or why.
James Smite was shown to have been a wealthy businessman.
He claimed to have started his business ventures with money that
he won in a lottery. Smite, like Faccio, liked to play cards. The
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two had played together before in Atlantic City and it was there
that they arranged to play again at Smite's home.
On direct examination in court, Smite testified that in the
course of their playing together, he had become convinced that
Faccio and Kreskin were card sharks and that they had cheated
him out of a significant amount of money. They argued over this
at Smite's house the day before Faccio was beaten. While he
claimed no responsibility for those injuries and could not explain
how or why the beating of Faccio had occurred, Smite conceded
that he was angry at Faccio and "was not unduly put out" by the
fate Faccio had suffered. In his trial testimony Smite said, "Hey
look, this guy's the type that makes enemies, know what I mean?"
While on the witness stand, Tony Kreskin, the defendant,
expressed his belief that Smite had ordered Crosby to give Faccio
a beating for revenge. Smite denied this. Concerning Crosby's
death, Kreskin testified, "It was one of those things. It was an
accident. What else can I say?"
In her summation, the prosecutor argued to the jury in part
as follows:
Look, we all know what these characters Kreskin and
Faccio were up to. They're sharks. They follow their
noses, they live day-to-day. They play by their own rules.
And the rules of the game are clear: "You get my guy, I
get yours." And, ladies and gentlemen, that's precisely
what Kreskin did. That's how he played it. Crosby
crossed him, so he evened the score.
Apparently, the jury believed her; they convicted Kreskin of
manslaughter. As it turned out, however, the jury may not have
had all the facts before them.
Installment Two
Shortly after the trial, a young film-maker by the name of
Earl Orris happened to read about the Kreskin case in the
newspapers. It piqued his interest, so he decided to learn more
about the matter. Through his own investigative efforts, Orris
came up with some interesting facts, some of which had not come
out at the trial. For instance, there was the nurse who cared for
Crosby at the hospital before Crosby died. In the course of an
interview that Orris conducted and filmed, the nurse said that
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Crosby kept saying the same thing, over and over, before he died:
"If only I'd kept the music on, it'd be all right."
When Orris went to visit Kreskin in prison he asked Kreskin
about what the nurse had said. In his own filmed interview,
Kreskin gave this response:
Oh yeah, right. Just before the accident see I had the car
stereo on, you know? I always drive to music. And at
one point, Crosby just reached out and snapped the thing
off. I mean, I couldn't believe it. So I turned to him, I
was pissed, and I said, "Why'd you do that for?" I was
staring at him, kinda hard like. Then all of a sudden I
see, there was this truck . . . I spotted this truck real
close by. And I guess . . . well, I didn't see it soon
enough, so, anyway, you know, I had to jerk the car away
fast. And there wasn't time, so, I just lost it, lost control
...
. So, yeah. Sure. If Crosby had just left the
goddamn music on everything might've been all right.
When asked why he did not tell this to the prosecutor, Kreskin
said:
Why didn't I bring it up? I'll tell you why. How could
it've helped? By showing I was really pissed at Crosby in
the car? Sure. Great. Don't you see that'd only help the
jury believe I wanted to get him? Nah, it couldn't but've
hurt me anyway. The DA would've seen to that, that's
for sure.
The release of Orris's film, which included these and other
interview fragments, created a stir. Faced with growing public
pressure, and given the new evidence that the film interviews
seemed to provide, officials eventually felt compelled to reopen
Kreskin's case. A new judge reviewed the matter and after
finding serious prosecutorial errors decided to throw out Kreskin's
conviction. A second trial was then conducted. This time Kreskin
wound up with an acquittal.
After the verdict everyone said that the film had been a key
factor in getting Kreskin off. When the media reported how the
defense had played Orris's film for the second jury, the notoriety
sparked even more interest in the film and the person who made
it. A number of interviews with Earl Orris followed. And in the
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course of one of those interviews some information came to light

that the second jury had not known.
Installment Three
According to the film-maker's public account, he'd never
intended to make a documentary film about the Kreskin case.
Orris's interest was more "metaphysical," he said, than historical.
The driving idea, as Orris put it in one interview, had to do with
how "things seem to just happen in life, without reasons." The
film, he said, was meant to be about fate, about how people's lives
are manipulated by events beyond their control. It was meant to
portray how people "deny their helplessness by making up stories
about reality after the fact." According to Orris, "stories provide
rationales, explanations. Like the rationale the film gives. It's a
device to make sense of things. It gives people a sense of control.
But it's all self-deception. At any rate, that's what I wanted the
film to convey."
As it turned out, the people Orris interviewed for the film had
been told about his interest in fate and coincidence. And the
interview fragments that the film used were in fact selected
because they dealt with Orris's theme. One film critic, who was
particularly interested in the increasingly popular docudrama
genre, personally approached some of the people who appeared in
the film, including the nurse who cared for Crosby before he died.
According to the critic, the nurse said that it was Earl Orris who
had raised the possibility that Crosby might have done something
to cause Kreskin to lose control of the car. The article that the
film critic wrote includes this alleged quote by the nurse:
We were talking about chance, and like how someone
could have his whole life changed by fate or something.
I said, "Yeah, there are things you never know." Maybe
Kreskin was out to even the score. Or maybe it was just
one of those things, fortuitous like. Crosby happens to
get killed and there's Kreskin a victim of circumstance,
framed for something he had no control over. I can
imagine that. Like if Kreskin was suddenly distracted.
Crosby reaches out and snaps off the radio. Just enough
time is lost to break Kreskin's concentration, and Kreskin
cracks the car up. Then in the hospital, there's Crosby
repeating the same thing, his dying words: "If only I'd
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kept the music on, it'd be all right."
If what this interview suggests is right, perhaps those who viewed
the film were misled. Perhaps the first jury had it right after all.
But the difficulties do not stop there.
Installment Four
Here begins the explanatory meta-text. It is a parasitic text,
taking its substance from the installments that precede it. In
return, it converts them, through its own explanatory system, into
discrete forms of understanding.
One part of the meta-text's explanatory system consists of
categories of narrative analysis. For example, consider the
schema or script. These are the mental blueprints that we carry
around in our head for quick assessments of what we may or
should be seeing or feeling in a given situation. Such blueprints
are simplified models of experiences we have had before. They
represent a kind of shorthand that transcribes our stored
knowledge of the world, describing kinds of situations, problems,
and personalities. These models allow us to economize on mental
energy: we need not interpret things afresh when there are preexisting categories that cover the experience or condition in
question.5 9
Consider, for example, the schema that applies to the
following situation: John went to a party. The next morning he
woke up with a headache. Now it is common knowledge thatpeople drink too much at parties and wake up the next day
feeling hungover. The situation described leaves out the explanation. But we have no trouble supplying it. There is a schema in
our head that quickly comes to mind to provide that explanation."0 The point is that the explanation that we come up with
59. See ACTUAL MINDS, supra note 32, at 48 (referring to these models as the
constituents of folk wisdom); see also Ronald J. Allen, The Nature of JuridicalProof, 13
CARDozo L. REV. 373, 403 (1991).
60. Consider, for example, how director Lawrence Kasdan, in his film Grand Canyon,
makes use of the latent stereotypes that people absorb from the popular culture. In one
of the opening scenes of his film we see a white male chatting on his car phone while
driving a late model Lexus sedan through a poor neighborhood of Los Angeles. A BMW
occupied by several young black males passes in the other direction. They exchange
glances. Minutes later the white driver's car begins to lose power. The BMW passes by
again, its occupants staring at the Lexus and its driver. The Lexus driver nervously
glances back at the BMW. Without having presented a single explicit image of violence
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goes beyond the information given. We fill in the gap. It is like
solving a riddle. For example, what activity is being described in
the following passage:
First you arrange things into different groups. Of course,
one pile may be sufficient depending on how much there
is to do. If you have to go somewhere else due to lack of
facilities that is the next step, otherwise you are pretty
well set. . . . After the procedure is completed, one
arranges the materials into different groups again. Then
they can be put into their appropriate places. Eventually
they will be used once more and the whole cycle will then
have to be repeated.6 1
Doing the laundry, of course. But it is the application of the
appropriate schema that allows this otherwise gibberish-filled
paragraph to make sense.
So far, the first part of this installment's explanatory system
has dealt with mental schemata and scripts. The second part
addresses how solving the riddle of a situation's or a text's
meaning requires that we go beyond the information that the
situation or text offers. In the matter of narrative, one might say
that there is a surface ("manifest") story and an underlying
("latent") story. The surface story may tell us about a particular
person or event. Beneath that description, however, lies another
tale. The underlying tale is the one that we fill in by bringing
meaning schemata up to the surface. As a result, the surface tale
turns into something more complex, perhaps a symbol of
something else. That is why we can say something like, "He's
been drinking and dressing that way since she left him for his
friend Carl," and understand by it a recognizable emotional state:
despondency, or something like it.
This talk about the latent story beneath the surface tale
evokes talk about an old rhetorical device: the enthymeme.
Aristotle spoke about the enthymeme as a bit of incomplete
reasoning." The argument being offered makes sense only when
the audience fills in what is missing from it. Having induced the

in this scene, Kasdan successfully mobilizes a sense of foreboding. See GRAND CANYON

(Twentieth Century Fox 1991).
61. See Allen, supra note 59, at 404-05.
62. See Witteveen, supra note 28, at 189.
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audience to participate in this way, the arguer has brought them
closer to his side. For they now find themselves actively supplying, out of their own world knowledge, the very thing that makes
the argument make sense. And since the premise comes from
them, not the arguer, shouldn't they believe it to be so?3
Now let's apply this installment's explanatory system to the
stories from which it takes its substance. Consider Installment
One. How does one make sense of a situation involving professional card players who get into a fight over a high stakes poker
game with a wealthy businessman who claims to have built up his
wealth from the lottery? By filling in the gaps, of course. And
the surface story readily complies by conjuring up a latent
schema, such as: Everyone knows these are no ordinary card
players. At which point a typical scenario unfurls: card sharks,
the rackets, shady business deals, a life of scams and violence. It
is a familiar story, which suggests that the prosecutor got it right.
These are people who play by their own rules, and in their game
it's "you get my guy, I get yours." Kreskin's conviction makes
sense.
By a similar process of filling in the gaps, Installment Two
also makes sense. What happens when you put together the
following surface story elements: a prosecutor who couldn't care
less about facts (when what she's after is the conviction), a system
of justice that is capable of going astray, and a victim of
circumstances-someone who happens to be at the wrong place at
the wrong time. Someone who also happens to be an outsider
whom many people would be only too happy to condemn at the
first opportunity. From this perspective what the film shows
makes sense, for a suitable interpretive schema is now at hand:
Kreskin became a scapegoat. He was convicted for who he was,
not for something that he had done.
There is a meaning-making schema for Installment Three as
well: the docudrama. Everyone these days knows that TV and
film people are willing to play fast and loose with the facts.
Think of Oliver Stone's interspersing of real and simulated

63. See VICO, supra note 21.
The skillful orator... omits things that are well known, and while impressing
on his hearers secondary truth, he tacitly reminds them of the primal points
he has left out and while he carries through his argument, his listeners are

made to feel they are completing it themselves. This is the way in which the
orator stirs their minds before he sets about arousing their emotions.
Id. at 25.
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"documentary" JFK, 4 or NBC's use of incendiary devices to rig
a truck explosion on its "newsmagazine" show, Dateline NBC,6 5
or the profusion of television crime shows with their reenactments or live recordings (to the extent one can still tell the
difference) of everyday police activities. 6 Considering the mass
media's apparent willingness to blend reality and simulation, it
comes as no surprise that Orris's film manipulated people into
believing something that probably was not true. Indeed, once we
see that it is the docudrama schema that explains Orris's film, a
clear conclusion follows: Orris duped people with that nurse's
dying words scenario and his simulated nothing-but-fate tale.
And here perhaps another schema may also come to mind:
postmodernism. For isn't this what postmodernists do? They play
with the thin line that separates fiction and truth, fantasy and
reality, myth and law.
So much then for Installment Three, but what about the
meta-text itself, Installment Four. Is there a schema for this too?
Would proposing a schema for a system of schemata be going too
far? Yes, and no.
The answer may be no, if the schema to be applied tracks
what I previously referred to as soft-core postmodernism. Most of
us can accept being told that there are schemata or other
categories of meaning making that we carry in our heads and
commonly use in a variety of everyday contexts in order to make
sense of events and people around us. 67 True, this way of
understanding human understanding suggests that meaning is
being actively constructed, that it is not just out there waiting to
be discovered. But this is an acceptable view in the sense that
uncovering the various meaning schemata that typically assist us
in our interpretation of events and texts is by no means synonymous with the erosion of belief. For example, to talk about the
mythic subtext of films like Star Wars,68 or Red River,6 9 or of

64. JFK (Warner Brothers 1991).
65. DatelineNBC (NBC television broadcast, Nov. 17, 1993).
66. See, e.g., Stories of Highway Patrol(Fox television broadcast); Cops (Fox television
broadcast); A Current Affair (ABC television broadcast); Rescue 911 (ABC television
broadcast).
67. Of course not everyone is inclined to accept such postmodern, constructivist
insights. See, e.g., Aaron Wildavsky, Jerome S. Bruner: Acts of Meaning, RESPONSIVE
COMMUNITY, Summer 1991, at 78; cf Richard K. Sherwin, In Bruner'sDefense, RESPONSIVE
COMMUNITY, Winter 1991/92, at 93.
68. STAR WARS (Twentieth Century Fox 1977).
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a text like Shakespeare's The Tempest,7" or even of a defense
attorney's closing argument, need hardly impair our continued
enjoyment of the effect that the story has upon us. We are still
moved.
So in this respect, no: finding a schema for a system of
meaning schemata, what I've called here soft-core postmodernism,
probably would not be going too far. Knowledge about the
different ways in which meaning can be and is being constructed
is something we can live with. Specific beliefs may be affected by
such knowledge, but belief itself is not at issue. At the same
time, however, there is another schema that one might apply to
Installment Four, and by extension to all the installments that I
have been discussing, that would go too far. It is a schema that
a number of contemporary scholars, including scholars of law,
have found attractive."' I call it the schema of hard-coreless

69. RED RIVER (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer/United Artists 1948).
70. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST (Stephen Orgel ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1987)
(n.d.)
71. See, e.g., Stanley Fish, Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1773
(1987). Fish contends:
(1) that in whatever form it appears the argument for theory fails, (2) that
theory is not and could not be used to do what Moore, Dworkin, and the
Critical Legal Studies movement want it to do, generate and/or guide practice,
(3) that when theory is in fact 'used' it is in the way Unger so dislikes, in order
'retrospectively' to justify a decision reached on other grounds, (4) that theory
is essentially a rhetorical and political phenomenon whose effects are purely
contingent.
Id. at 1781.
In short, according to Fish, since we are already constituted by a particular practice
or interpretive community (be it 'judging" or "theorizing about judging") there is nothing
we can say, or that another can say to us, that is not already predetermined by who we
and the utterer already are and what it is that we or s/he already do. See STANLEY FISH,
Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES 171-73
(1980) (suggesting that it is "interpretive communities," rather than either the text or the
reader, that produce meanings); Stanley Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1325 (1984)
[hereinafter Fish, Fish v. Fiss].
The person who looks about and sees, without reflection, a field already
organized by problems, impending decisions, possible courses of action, goals,
consequences, desiderata, etc. is not free to choose or originate his own
meanings, because a set of meanings has, in a sense, already chosen him and
is working itself out in the actions of perception, interpretation, judgment, etc.
he is even now performing.
Fish, Fish v. Fiss, supra, at 1333. Or as Pierre Schlag puts it (aptly noting the ultimate
irresponsibility of Fish's position): "You can't choose your interpretive construct because
you are always already within them." Pierre Schlag, Fish v. Zapp: The Case of the
Relatively Autonomous Self, 76 GEO. L.J. 37, 55 (1987).
Schlag takes Fish's deconstructive efforts a step further by deconstructing, in turn,
Fish's notion of "interpretive communities" and of the "autonomous self" who supposedly
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postmodernism. Unlike the soft-core kind, this brand of
postmodernism derides belief itself. According to this schema, it
is schemata all the way down: there is no substance to feed on,
only form.
Consider in this regard Jean Baudrillard's vision of the
current Western cultural scene: "Communication is too slow ....
In the to-and-fro of communication, the instantaneity of looking,
light and seduction is already lost."72 In this view, our culture

appears to be rapidly slipping from communication with content,
into simulation, what Baudrillard calls "the ecstasy of the
real."73 According to Baudrillard, this state of ecstasy is a state
of empty form.74 Here images are stripped of meaning. Their
naked force is akin to the force of seduction, or pornography. This
is hard-coreless postmodernism: a condition in which meanings
flatten out, and impersonal forces, like coincidence and fate,
displace human intentionality. 75 It is a condition in which we
may find millions of contemporary tele-viewers as they zap
around the dial, prospecting for images, making shows out of
chance associations 76 -or as they let MTV do the surface imagesurfing for them amid a profusion of quick-cuts, multiple montage,
slow dissolves, animation, computer graphics, magnified close-ups,
wild angles, and product sell mixed indiscernibly with world
events, rock stars, politicians, starving children, catastrophes of
belongs to such a community. Id. at 51 ("There is no reason to believe in interpretive
communities or in the relatively autonomous self.").
Perhaps Duncan Kennedy caught the drift of what's left after such thorough
deconstruction when he declared: "I want paradox and unconsciousness. Paradox and
unconsciousness allow one experientially, existentially, to exist outside of the contradictionspace of separateness and unity." Peter Gabel & Duncan Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven,
36 STAN. L. REV. 1, 23 (1984).
72. BAUDRILLARD, supra note 56, at 8.
73. Id. at 9.
74. Id. at 14.
75. For a fuller discussion of this cultural development, see Law Frames, supra note
35.
76. See ODO.MARQUARD, IN DEFENSE OF THE ACCIDENTAL 80 (Robert M. Wallace trans.,

1991).
A central fact about the present seems to me to be that ... the perception of
reality, and fiction [] increasingly take on a semifictive character, and thus
tend to converge with each other. That is why it is so easy, nowadays, to
ignore really terrible things and to be convinced by imagined positive things,
and almost easier, even, to believe in imagined terrible things and to be blind
to really positive ones-in other words, to accept what suits one and to
suppress what does not.
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war, Nike, Adidas, Coke, Pepsi, Porsche. v
In short, according to the hard-coreless view, overcommunication, the massive influx and surplusage of images, has become the
mass media's hallmark. The result is a popular cultural reality
in which there are "more signs than referrents, more images than
meanings that can be attached to them."78 In this hard-coreless
reality, it grows increasingly difficult to tell what is real after all:
the event, the 'infotainment' news of it, the full length feature, or
the almost instant television docudrama or mini-series version?79
But what would such a hard-coreless postmodern schema look
like in the context of a possible case of homicide, and how might
one go about applying it here? There is a way. For example,
assume that everything that I have said so far about Tony
Kreskin and company is made up. Imagine, if you will, that the
stories that have been told were actually based on a Paul Auster
novel, The Music of Chance,8 ° and on the filmmaker Erroll
Morris, whose so-called documentary film, The Thin Blue Line,

77. See Law Frames, supra note 35, at 47 n.68.
78. TWITCHELL, supra note 56, at 51; see also BAUDRILLARD, supra note 56, at 52
("Illusion is not false, for it doesn't use false signs; it uses senseless signs, signs that point
nowhere. This is why it deceives and disappoints our demand for meaning, but it does so
enchantingly.").
What fascinates everyone is the debauchery of signs, that reality, everywhere
and always, is debauched by signs. This is the interesting game, and this is
what happens in the media, in fashion, in publicity and more generally, in the
spectacle of politics, technology, science ... because perversion of reality, the
spectacular distortion of facts and representations, the triumph of simulation
is as fascinating as catastrophe-and it is one, in effect ....
BAUDRILLARD, supra note 56, at 74.
79. See John J. O'Connor, On TV, Truth is More Instant than Fiction,N.Y. TIMES, June
3, 1993, at C17. ("[T]he time lapse between factual event and television dramatization gets
shorter and shorter. In recent weeks, NBC broadcast three 'instant docudramas' within
four days: 'Ambush in Waco,' 'HurricaneAndrew: Triumph over Disaster,' and 'Without
Warning: Terror in the Towers.'"); John J. O'Connor, Critic's Notebook: The Line Between
Dramaand Lies, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1992, at C1I ("Television's current Amy Fisher Film
Festival can be evaluated on several levels, not least the one that raises questions about
liars and lies. The three slapdash docudramas, one each for ABC, CBS and NBC, are
indeed instantly disposable programs."). According to Judd Parkin, ABC's senior vicepresident for movies and mini-series, "We're in the era of 'Hard Copy.' There are so many
Once a story
reality-based shows that it's difficult for us not to pay attention to them ....
has made the rounds, it has a presold awareness that's impossible to create even with a
best-selling book." Jeff Silverman, Murder, Mayhem Stalk TV, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1992,
§ 2, at 1, 28; see also Stark, supra note 38, at 232 ("A recent poll revealed that seventythree percent of those children surveyed could not cite any differences between judges
depicted on television shows and those in real life.").
80. PAUL AUSTER, THE MUSIC OF CHANCE (1990).
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triggered a review of a capital murder case that eventually led to
a dismissal of charges against a man a jury convicted and
sentenced to death.8 '
To indulge such an assumption here (which, by the way, is an
accurate one) invites a number of reactions. For one thing, it
seems to invite disbelief in my credibility.8 2 After all, wasn't I
supposed to be discussing a real homicide case? To learn
otherwise is surely a disenchanting experience. Second, it seems
to deliberately collide with the narrative expectations that readers
generally bring along when they encounter a law review article.
Surely the reader should not expect literary criticism when he or
she is seeking an analysis of law.'
Perhaps then the schema of hard-coreless postmodernism is

81. See Law Frames, supra note 35. In the film, Morris exposed the Dallas DA's
frame-up of Randall Dale Adams who was sentenced to life in prison for a murder he
(apparently) did not commit. See THE THIN BLUE LINE (Third Floor Productions 1988).
As a result of the questions about the Adams case that Morris helped raise, the authorities
re-opened the case and ultimately threw out the conviction. Motion for New Trial Hearing,
Judge's Rulings, Texas v. Randall Dale Adams, No. w-77-1286-I (Dallas Co., Texas, Nov.
30, 1988).
82. This is a cardinal sin in just about any rhetorical handbook. See ARISTOTLE,
RHETORIC 24 (W. Rhys Roberts trans., Modern Library, 1954) (n.d.) ("Of the modes of
persuasion furnished by the spoken word there are three kinds. The first kind depends
on the personal character of the speaker.... ."); MICHAEL E. TIGAR, EXAMINING WITNESSES
(1993).
When you think about stereotypes, you are dealing with a form of
prejudice. You must be brutally candid. If you are a woman, does your
manner play into conservative ideas about 'shrill, hag-like' conduct or 'tearful
whining'? Defending a corporation, do you play to type by harrumphing your
way through the case in a superior manner?
TIGAR, supra, at 293-94.
83. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, The Degradationof ConstitutionalDiscourse,81 GEO. L.J.
251 (1992) (regarding the best manner of evaluating the use of stories in legal scholarship).
Readers connect particular invented stories to the world's reality differently
from the way they connect particular factual reports to that reality ....
An
author must somehow either signal that she is using the genre of reportage or
that of imaginative literature, or make it clear that she wishes to force her
readers to confront the implications of blurring the genres.
Id. at 273; but see Gary Peller, The Discourse of ConstitutionalDegradation,81 GEO. L.J.
313 (1992).
Within the evaluative frame employed by Tushnet, texts can be parsed
according to the dichotomous boxes of fact and fiction, which themselves
correspond to objectivity and subjectivity, the objective fact contrasted to the
subjective story . . . . The formalism of Tushnet's approach consists in
believing that simply the form of presentation-a labeling as a novel-would
change its meaning. The objectivism consists in believing that there is a
distinction between an accurate description and a filtered re-presentation.
Id. at 329.
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an apt candidate for capturing the meaning of what I have been
up to. Indeed, if it turned out to be the case that meaning
schemata were all I cared about, without regard to the substance
of reality, if I thought there was no reality, only meaning
schemata, would I not be inviting you to enter a hard-coreless
postmodern world in which belief cannot be sustained?
Yet that is not my belief, nor does it reflect my intent here.
To the contrary, my purpose in distinguishing hard-coreless from
soft-core postmodernism is to preserve a place in legal studies for
the latter but to dispel the notion that a place exists for the
former. Put simply, I can think of no useful role for hard-coreless
postmodernism in legal scholarship.
I believe that the
ineradicable need for judgment, the need to reach particular
outcomes in particular cases, and the need for belief to sustain the
meanings that legal stories and arguments call to mind for the
sake of judgment, will ensure that hard-coreless postmodernism
finds no fruitful foothold in the legal field. Baldly stated, the life
of hard-coreless postmodernism is a life that cannot be lived. The
same cannot be said, however, about soft-core postmodernism.
Unlike its schizy, hyper-real, surface-gleaming, hard-coreless
cousin, soft-core postmodernism either closes around a coherent
meaning or at least points to one.' Of course it makes use of
images, but it does so not for their own (insular or self-referential)
sake alone. Soft-core postmodern storytelling hooks its images
into coherent forms that derive from known storytelling genres,
familiar stereotypes, and deeply rooted cultural myths. Thus,
unlike the hard-coreless postmodern montage with its endless
shifting surfaces and highly disjunctive, impersonal contiguities
and free associations, here human motivation and intentionality
continue to operate. In the soft-core world, internal forces (like
the drive for meaning in ritual, drama, and myth) rather than
wholly external forces (like chance and fate) can still account for
events in the social world.85 In sum, according to the view I am
affirming here, capturing belief both in straightforward, causallysequenced tales (of detection, for instance) and in acausal, nonlinear stories (of isolated imagery or latent mythic archetypes) is

84. See Law Frames, supra note 35.
85. See, e.g., FRANK MCCONNELL, STORYTELLING AND MYTHMAKING: IMAGES FROM FILM
AND LITERATURE (1979); VICTOR TURNER, DRAMAS, FIELDS AND METAPHORS: SYMBOLIC
ACTION IN HUMAN SOCIETY (1974); MAN AND His SYMBOLS (Carl G. Jung ed., Doubleday
& Co., Inc. 1968).
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an inescapable part of the workaday world in which we live and
in which law and lawyers operate.
In the next part of this article, I conclude with a brief illustration of the immediately preceding observation as it applies to the
appellate briefs that were submitted to the Supreme Court in the
landmark case of Miranda v. Arizona.8 Here we will see two
sharply contrasting narratives. In one, the brief-writer, after
having supplied the specific meaning schemata by which to
interpret the argument being presented, expressly invites the
reader to participate in a familiar deductive-syllogistic method of
legal analysis, applying applicable law to a discrete set of facts.
By contrast, the second brief-writer tells a surface story that
presents the reader with a riddle, or perhaps one could say that
it creates an enthymeme.8" For rather than explicitly providing
the means of solving the riddle, or of supplying the enthymeme's
missing premise thus converting it into a proper syllogism, this
brief invites the reader to complete the surface story's meaning by
drawing upon his or her own implicit world knowledge and basic
beliefs.
If I am successful in this final part of the analysis, it will
become apparent that to a significant extent effective lawyering
requires sound narrative analysis. Examples include choice of
imagery, and the associations that one's images conjure; choice of
genre, and the narrative expectations that the genre produces;
choice of role for one's audience, and the passive deference to
externally posited meaning schemata or the active participation
in the construction of meaning from interior sources that the role
invites-these and other strategic narrative considerations are
hardly self-evident. Indeed, in order to be effective they must be
deliberately cultivated, consciously assessed, and reflexively
practiced. Consider in this regard the stories that the Supreme
Court heard in the case of Miranda v. Arizona.'
II. STRATEGIC STORYTELLING IN MIRANDA V. ARIZONA

Ernesto Miranda was charged with having kidnapped and
raped an eighteen-year-old girl in the vicinity of Phoenix, Arizona,
on March 3, 1963. He was also a suspect in an unrelated robbery
86. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
87. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
88. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 436.
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that took place several months prior to the incident involving the
rape and kidnapping. On March 13, 1963, Miranda was arrested
at his home and taken into custody to the police station. At the
precinct he was placed in a line-up and identified by two complaining witnesses, the one for robbery and the other for rape.
Miranda was then interrogated at the police station regarding
both matters.8 9
Miranda was convicted at separate trials of both the robbery
and the kidnapping-rape offenses. 9° Only the latter, however,
became the subject of an appeal. The focus of that appeal was on
Miranda's confession while in police custody. Specifically, the
legal question raised concerned the failure of the interrogating
officers to inform Miranda that anything he said while in custody
would be used against him at trial and that he had the right to
consult an attorney. 91
A short time before the Supreme Court heard Miranda's
appeal, the Court had held that a person accused of a crime must
be permitted to consult with his attorney when the criminal
process has shifted from an "investigatory" to an "accusatory"
phase.9 2 The Court offered the following case-specific scenario
for when such a shift may be said to have occurred: If the State's
focus is
on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into
police custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has requested and been denied
[counsel], and the police have not effectively warned him
of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent, the
accused has been denied "the Assistance of Counsel" in
violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution as
"made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth
93
Amendment."
When such a violation occurs, any statement elicited by police
during the interrogation must be excluded from trial.

89. Brief for Petitioner at 3-5, Miranda (No. 759) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner].

90. See id. at 4.
91. See id. at 2-3.
92. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 492 (1964).

93. Id. at 490-91 (quoting Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963)).
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Following the Escobedo decision, there was a great deal of
controversy over the scope of the Court's ruling. How fact specific
was it meant to be? Were all the elements that were present in
the Escobedo case necessary to the Court's ruling?
Given this legal posture, the respective tasks of appellate
counsel were clear. Miranda's task was to persuade the Court
that its concern about fair process, as expressed in Escobedo,
should extend to cover the situation in Miranda's case-even
though Miranda, unlike Escobedo, never specifically asked to
consult with an attorney, nor had one been retained and present
in the police precinct as was the case at the time of Escobedo's
interrogation. The Arizona Attorney General's (respondent's) task
was to make clear that there was no reason to expand existing
case law beyond what Escobedo had established simply to cover
Miranda's situation.
Not surprisingly, these are precisely the two positions that
opposing counsel staked out in their respective briefs. The
question I want to pursue here is: what stories did they tell, and
how? This inquiry leads to some not so obvious findings.
For one thing, we find that Miranda's brief takes the form of
a strikingly dramatic narrative, replete with biographical details
about its central character. In contrast, the State's brief pursues
a straightforward argument in the form of a completed syllogism.
By virtue of these genre choices, the reader of Miranda's brief
finds herself cast in the active (one might say heroic) role of
advancing a progressive movement within the law in the direction
of basic beliefs. Notably, the story that Miranda tells does not
explicitly articulate what those beliefs are. Rather, it invites the
reader to fill in the normative content of those beliefs based on his
or her own response to the surface tale about who Ernesto
Miranda is and what happened to him while he was in police
custody. In short, it is deemed sufficient for the surface tale to
activate the brief-reader's implicit values of fairness and equality.
By contrast, the reader of the Government's brief is cast in a more
passive, conservative role as upholder of existing (externally
posited) rules. Moreover, respondent's brief reader is expressly
provided with all that is needed for judgment: the facts of the
case, the relevant law, and the law's application to the facts.
Let's take a closer look at each of these texts.
The theme of Miranda's brief has three suggestive and
overlapping components. They are: fate, chance, and secrecy.
From the associations that flow from this triad of images there
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emerges an implicit normative framework for a proper outcome to
the case. All three elements are at work in the following initial
overview of Miranda's argument:
When Miranda walked out of Interrogation Room 2 on
March 13, 1963, his life for all practical purposes was
over. Whatever happened later was inevitable; the die
had been cast in that room at that time. There was no
duress, no brutality. Yet when Miranda finished his
conversation with Officers Cooley and Young, only the
ceremonies of the law remained; in any realistic sense,
his case was done. We have here the clearest possible
example of Justice Douglas' [sic] observation, "what takes
place in the secret confines of the police station may be
more critical than what takes place at the trial."9 4
First, the element of fate. Whatever happened after the
interrogation, says Miranda, was "inevitable." In other words,
with Miranda's confession in hand, the trial process was an empty
formality; its outcome was predetermined from the start. But of
course (and here speaks the implicit schema) everyone knows that
this should not be. The trial should be an open search for truth,
not a farcical gesture in which the parties simply go through the
motions of doing justice.
Second, the element of chance. Miranda says that "the die
had been cast in that room at that time."9 5 In other words,
whatever endowments Ernesto Miranda happens to bring with
him into Interrogation Room 2-whether it be psychological
endowment, or the social and financial means of obtaining a good
education, or the kind of life experience that can serve as a basis
for practical knowledge about the ways of the world-these chance
endowments are what determine how the die will be cast within.
But surely (and here speaks the implicit schema) everyone knows
that justice should not be a matter of chance, and that getting a
fair shake within the legal system is something that the rich and
the poor, the mentally ill and the psychologically healthy, the
socially advantaged and the socially deprived are entitled to in
equal measure.

94. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 89, at 10 (quoting Crooker v. California, 357 U.S.
433, 444-45 (1958) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).

95. Id.
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Third, the element of secrecy. In his brief, Miranda cites
Justice Douglas's observation that "what takes place in the secret
confines of the police station may be more critical than what takes
place at the trial."9
Here the operative image suggests a
schematic synthesis that weaves together all three elements:
everyone knows that secrecy is an attribute of power and control.
The person who is in a position to keep things secret is also in a
position to control the flow of information. Only that person has
the power to determine what shall be known and what shall
remain under wraps. And it is the police who enjoy that position
of power, that control, in the context of Interrogation Room 2 and
all other rooms like it across the country.
The synthesis that emerges is this: we are faced here with a
situation where the accused in police custody is helpless,
friendless, at the mercy of forces beyond his control. He faces the
force of fate (once his confession is obtained) and the force of
chance (in light of the endowments he happens to bring with him
into the interrogation room). And it is the police who create and
exploit these forces by virtue of the unchecked and unbalanced
power and control that they wield over the accused who has
entered their secret confines.
"What can counter such intolerable inequality and unfairness?" Miranda's brief implicitly asks. The answer it provides is
suggestive: "This case is not to be decided by the color-matching
technique of determining whether one case looks just like another
case. We deal here with fundamentals of liberty, and so, in
consequence, with basic belief.""7 What exactly are the basic
beliefs that Miranda has in mind? He does not specify. It is
enough perhaps to demonstrate that the law is moving in a
progressive direction in this area ("there is a tide in the affairs of
men"98 ) and that the Court is in a position to seize the moment
and join in that heroic spirit. Why heroic? Because the Justices
are poised to transcend the petty formalism of legal analogy for
the more exalted action of befriending the helpless, coming to the
aid of the most vulnerable in society. Heroic because the Court
can now restore balance to a situation that is awash in inequality
and unfairness. They need only extend the protections embodied
in the Bill of Rights.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 35.
98. Id. at 34.
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In short, Miranda's narrative need not specify the facts of the
case. Indeed, given the situation as it is, those facts cannot be
known. (Who knows what goes on behind closed police doors?)
But who needs facts when the uncertainties involved implicate
such vulnerability and potential for police abuse? Let the Court
find the words that will justify what justice demands. And let it
suffice for Miranda to say: the Justices of the Court know what
needs to be done; they have the authority to do it; let it then be
done. The subjunctive mood of Miranda's story, fueled by factual
uncertainty and emotional outrage, casts the decisionmaker in the
active role of savior on behalf of the disadvantaged and the
helpless.
Unlike Miranda's dramatic narrative, the Attorney General
of Arizona composed a brief that was premised upon objective
facts and clear law knitted together by the power of syllogistic
reasoning. The briefs central plot line works this way: (1) the
fact is that Ernesto Miranda is not nearly as disadvantaged as
appellant's brief makes him out to be, -.nd in fact he does not
deserve the Court's solicitude; (2) there was no police abuse or
overreaching in this case, and if Miranda gave himself away that
is his, not the authorities' doing; (3) in any event, a basic syllogism takes care of the matter: (i) Escobedo is the applicable law;
(ii) Ernesto Miranda, unlike Danny Escobedo, never requested the
advice of counsel while in police custody; (iii) therefore, since the
police did nothing to refuse such a request, Miranda's right to
counsel, unlike Escobedo's, was never blocked by the authorities.
In short, according to the Attorney General of Arizona, Miranda's
brief asked the Court to ignore "not only the plain wording of the
opinion in Escobedo, but to completely disregard the factual and
legal bases for the opinions cited in [Escobedo's] historical
analysis.""
Of course, what the Attorney General failed to go on to
address in his brief is why the factual distinction that he made
between the Escobedo and Miranda cases is as significant as he
apparently believed it to be. In the respondent's view, apparently
it was sufficient to say that there is no constitutional reason for
the Court to equate Miranda and Escobedo. Simply stated, his
claim is this: if Danny Escobedo was clever enough to think of
hiring and seeking advice from an attorney during an important

99. Brief for Respondent at 20, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (No. 759)
[hereinafter Brief for Respondent].
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phase of the police investigation, while Ernesto Miranda was not
so clever, that is an inequality of no constitutional
consequence. 1°°
With the aid of hindsight, we know that respondent's
argument failed to take seriously enough the Court's concern
about establishing appropriate procedural safeguards to counter
potential police abuses.1 ' But, putting aside what respondent
might have said in light of how the Supreme Court ultimately
ruled, important questions arise based on a closer consideration
of respondent's narrative strategy. For example, it is apparent
simply from reading the two appellate briefs together that in at
least three significant respects the Attorney General needlessly
reinforced Miranda's story line. First, respondent explicitly
discussed, without ever defusing, the reality of police mistakes
and errors which require judicial exposure and correction. 2
Second, respondent acknowledged the existence of broad popular
support (in professional journals, national magazines, and
political speeches) for the more vulnerable members of our
society-thus needlessly bolstering Miranda's image of a new
birth 10 3 and a "tide in the affairs of men." °4
Third, by
conceding the impossibility of proving the existence of police
coercion, respondent not only undermined his own claim that
Miranda's description of police abuse in this case was inaccurate,
but he also reinforced Miranda's assertion that it was precisely
the unknowability of what goes on behind closed police doors that
required corrective judicial action.
In addition to unwittingly bolstering Miranda's narrative
strategy, respondent also seriously neglected his own. The

100. Id. at 24-25.
101. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457-58.
It is obvious that such an interrogation environment is created for no
purpose other than to subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner. This
atmosphere carries its own badge of intimidation. To be sure, this is not
physical intimidation, but it is equally destructive of human dignity. The
current practice of incommunicado interrogation is at odds with one of our
Nation's most cherished principles-that the individual may not be compelled
to incriminate himself. Unless adequate protective devices are employed to
dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement
obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of his free choice.
Id. (footnote omitted).
102. Brief for Respondent, supra note 99, at 9.
103. See id. at 10.
104. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 89, at 34.
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hallmark of the case law upon which respondent relied was that
a totality of circumstances approach was better suited to dealing
with specific claims of possible police abuse than a universal
("bright line") rule. With this as respondent's main line of
argument, it is only natural for the reader to expect respondent's
narrative to feature both persuasive evocations of the strengths
of the existing case by case ("totality of circumstances") method of
analysis and demonstrations of the weaknesses of alternative
approaches. But respondent's text raised these expectations only
to disappoint them in the end. And the residual schema with
which one is left is the one that crudely asserts: criminals get
what they deserve. 105 That is hardly the sort of claim that
uplifts the spirit, or that ennobles, or even serves to legitimate
inherited judicial wisdom.
It is far from certain that a different respondent's brief would
have led to a different outcome in Miranda, though the fact that
the Court divided five-to-four in favor of Miranda suggests that
such a possibility might have existed. In any event, such a
possibility is not the essential thing as far as I am concerned here.
For I hope that it has been enough to show that heightened
sensitivity to the strategic advantages and disadvantages of
choosing to tell a particular legal story in a particular way-for
example, by using specific images set within a particular genre
that consistently fulfills its own set of narrative expectations and
that accords with the role in which one's audience has been
cast-is not only of great practical value to practicing lawyers and
judges, but also a subject that richly rewards close scholarly
analysis. Indeed, legal storytelling is such a pervasive part of the
legal culture that it is hard to believe that this kind of scrutiny
has been so long in coming. That tide, however, may at last be
turning.
CONCLUSION

The three movements of thought contained in this article may
be summed up as follows. First, I have observed that there is
now under way a broad cultural development (for convenience,

105. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 99, at 24-25 ("Miranda and Escobedo are not
equal and there is no Constitutional reason for this Court to equate them in the manner
sought by petitioner, any more than there would be for this Court to balance their skill in
committing and concealing their crime.").
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call it postmodernism) that is deeply affecting the legal as well as
popular (or mainstream) culture. As part of this development, we
see a shift away from positivism, neutrality, and objectivism as
the dominant standards for legal scholarship and decisionmaking.
Interpretivism and constructivism are now providing alternative
standards. According to this competing view, what we believe
about an individual or an event is inextricably tied to the way in
which our belief is called into play (e.g., whether it is narratively
seduced, or made the captive of logic's necessity). The underlying
point here is this: human perception and cognition are never
without some interpretive framework within which reality and
meaning come into view.
This thought implicates a second one. If reality and meaning
depend, to a significant extent, on perceptual and cognitive
constructions, it becomes of no small interest to learn what
interpretive frameworks are at work in specific legal contexts.
One way to express this inquiry is to ask: what kinds of stories,
and what modes of storytelling, are being used by lawyers, judges,
and others within the legal system to construct and convey
meaning? This path of inquiry leads to a heightened awareness
of competing rhetorics and strategies of narration.
Such
awareness may operate on the plane of broad principle and
decontextualized abstraction or on the level of local voices, proper
names, and particularized dramas. From this perspective, recent
developments in legal scholarship, such as critical race studies,
feminist studies, and lawyering theory, can be seen as offshoots
of a cultural climate in which the positivist paradigm for meaning-making no longer stands alone.
The preceding leads to a third and final movement of thought.
If it is, as I have suggested, a matter of some scholarly interest
and practical worth for lawyers and law scholars to study how
legal storytelling can be (and is being) used to make sense of
individuals and events in a given set of circumstances, it is
appropriate to ask: what kinds of insights can we expect such an
analysis to provide? In response to this query, I have sought to
demonstrate the impact of several different narrative strategies
through redescriptions of a possible case of homicide and a critical
assessment of the briefs submitted to the Supreme Court in the
landmark case of Miranda v. Arizona. °"
These narrative

106. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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strategies include: one's choice of meaning schemes, which will
serve to fill in a given narrative gap; one's choice of narrative
genre, which will determine the expectations or norms by which
a particular story shall be read or experienced; and one's choice
of role for one's audience, which will determine whether they shall
be cast as passive affirmer of explicitly posited (imperative) norms
and historical facts, or as active cocreator based on a subjunctive
triggering of internalized norms and implicit scripts or scenarios.
Finally, there is this additional offshoot of my analysis. In
discussing the cultural impact of postmodernism, I have suggested
that it is important to distinguish two different kinds of
postmodernism. One kind, soft-core postmodernism, points to a
narrative form (i.e., a perceptual and cognitive paradigm) that
now actively competes with the objectivist, linear, causalsequential story form with which we have long been familiar.
Soft-core postmodern storytelling allows us to take account of
significant shifts in the medium of communication and, consequently, in the way we tend to make sense of ourselves, others,
and events around us. For example, we see from contemporary
film and television that it is possible to place great emphasis upon
an isolated image, or a rapid juxtaposition of image and sound, or
of image and image, in the making of a meaning. This is
something that we tend not to find in earlier generations' textbased narrative techniques, which commonly relied upon the
cumulative effect of linear, causal sequences. The issue here is
not whether meaning is possible, but rather how it is constituted.
By contrast, there is a second form of postmodernism, the hardcoreless kind, that exploits the phenomenon of constructivism
(which is to say, the human act of making meaning) as a way of
collapsing substantive meaning into the forms of its construction.
According to this hard-coreless view, it is as if there were no
"there" there, as if it were form all the way down.
But the hard-coreless postmodern view is one that cannot be
lived. For example, without belief to sustain the law's meanings,
the law's unshakable demand for judgment could not be met.
Thus, contrary to some contemporary scholars, I have concluded
that hard-coreless postmodernism has no useful role to play in the
legal field. Baldly stated, it is a game that none of us can afford
to play-not on the field of human conflict, pain, and death that
is the law's common ground. On the other hand, it is precisely
these stakes that require as complete an assessment as we can
manage of how the law's stories, whether in linear-causal or non-
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linear/acausal fashion, do captivate belief. There lies the calling
of the legal storytelling scholar.

